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The biological realm is examined as a semiosic system that transforms basic 
matter into a complex and intimately networked diversity of morphological forms 
according to generic sets of self‐generated rules of formation. Semiosis is 
understood to operate as a function f(x)=y  where the mediative rules of 
formation, f, operate within predictive or anticipatory capacities. Strong and weak 
anticipation are examined and the paper concludes that strong anticipation, 
operating as a virtual or imaginary hypothesis construction is a basic property of 
the biological realm. Strong anticipation enables the biological species to develop 
multiple hypothetical ‘network motifs’ about its future activities within the 
environment. The species will ‘choose’ one of these probabilities – any of which 
would be functional – to articulate in actual time and space. This theory rejects 
random mutation as the source of innovative evolution and adaptation. Weak 
anticipation is defined as Natural Selection and is described as a post hoc model of 
strong anticipation’s ‘selected solution’.  
 




The basic assumption of this paper is that biological organisms are semiosic systems. 
What does this mean? What is ‘semiosis’? 
 
Our world consists of energy organized as particulate forms of matter.  These 
individual forms or morphologies survive both as individual units and as general 
types or species, such as hydrogen atoms or oxygen molecules or e. coli bacterium 
or homo sapiens.  
 
The biological realm is extremely active in its processing and organization of matter.  
It can be more accurately described as a ‘complex adaptive system’.  Biological units 
 




are engaged, in themselves, in a constant transformative processing of matter, 
involving not only the assimilation and transformation of external matter taken 
within each unit, but as well, the eventual death of each individual unit as an active 
processing system. Such a temporal finiteness to the individual unit requires a 
separate system to produce more  units of that typology or species to enable this 
transformative processing of matter to continue with some reliability. This relentless 
processing of matter requires an authoritative and stable organizational model(s) or 
referential abstract(s) that oversees and guides the continuity of morphological 
organization. The biological realm, therefore, operates as a complex architecture of 
a referential template entangled with multiple individual actualizations of that 
template. This interplay between stability and diversity, or model and actual, is a 
fundamental aspect of the  biological realm (Ives and Carpenter 2007, Monod 1971, 
Rosen 1991).  
 
An important result of the entanglement of these two contrary processes is that the 
biological system has the capacity for the self‐organization or self‐definition of its 
referential model. This means that a biological morphological type can develop its 
model of itself, by itself, without external agential intervention. It is able to do this 
because these  two basic processes, the model and the actual,  interact constantly 
with each other in a state of existence defined as ‘far‐from‐equilibrium’ where the 
fragile asymmetry between the two contrary zones (model and actuality) creates an 
openness to each other’s informational data and therefore, enables the model to 
change and adapt (Bak 1996, Holland 1995, Kauffman 1993). We will be exploring 
the self‐organization of the referential model within the theme of strong and weak 
anticipation. 
 
Our universe and all its properties, physical, chemical, biological – and social, 
functions as a complex architecture (Taborsky 2002). The definition of complexity 
 




will be discussed further in this paper.. But the first basic requirement of matter – is 
that it must exist spatiotemporally or morphologically. This means that matter can 
only exist as a form that is finite in both time and space. Essentially, this means that 
matter exists only when it is measured within temporal and spatial perimeters. 
Morphology, as the process of generating these spatiotemporal forms, can be 
examined on several levels. There is a force of potentiality or an agenda of 
continuous morphological generation that counteracts the entropic dissipation of 
old forms. There are actuals which are understood as those particular 
spatiotemporally discrete or finite morphological units. And there is that 
compressed information, the type or model that provides a general reference 
template for developing the individual forms. We will return to these three 
processes. 
 
In addition, if we consider interactions between singular units, we observe another 
attribute of the biological realm – an adaptive capacity. The interaction that the 
individual morphological unit has with other units, where input data is transformed 
by some means to output data, is not mechanical and random but capable of 
constructive adaptive change. For example, coexisting competitor species of finches 
on the Galapagos islands over the years develop divergent jaws and beaks to exploit 
a variety of seeds (Grant 2006). Another example explains that “when young blue 
mussels sense that the green crabs are near their particular path – no one knows the 
telltale signal, but it’s likely a hormone or other chemical – they begin to thicken 
their shells. After several months, the shell is 5% to 10% thicker than it would 
otherwise have been…If crabs don’t happen to be around, the mussels don’t bother 
making thicker shells” (Freeman, A. and J. Byers 2006: 745).   
 
If we further analyze these interactions between singular units, we must 
acknowledge that the internal actions of the unit are differentiated from the 
 




external. There is an ‘interface’, usually a membrane, between the two realms, the 
internal and the external. However, this interface zone can extend beyond the ‘hard 
membrane’ by means of other sensory apparatus such as temperature 
differentiation and chemical volatiles, and it can be difficult to make precise 
definitions of what is internal, what is external, and how each behaves. For example,  
volatile chemical cues guide host location and host selection by parasitic plants; that 
is, the parasitic plant ‘sniffs out’ a new host (Runyon et al 2006).  As another 
example,  the prokaryote unicellular bacterium is, in its singularity, external to 
another bacterium; the cytoplasm is the internal mass inside the cell membrane of 
that bacterium. However, when a bacterium  reproduces by binary fission it splits in 
two; this singular cytoplasm sets up a situation where one part, the daughter cell, 
whose properties were once part of the internal cell matter, is now external to the 
original cell. 
 
We can see from the above few points that informative interactions between 
individual units and between general types, is a basic part of the biological 
infrastructure. The infrastructure is actually a complex informational network, 
where particular and general information, functionally interact not only within the 
same species but within different species. 
 
How does this complex biological activity function? Within a semiosic mode. As 
Jesper Hoffmeyer writes, ‘every life form exists both as itself, i.e., as an organism of 
“flesh and blood”, and as a coded description of itself, the latter being lodged within 
the remarkable DNA molecules of which the genetic material is composed” 
(1996:15).  Furthermore, this ‘code’ or model seems to function within a different 
temporal mode than the individual organism, for “it is the coded version, the genetic 
material, that is passed on to the next generation by means of procreation, while 
the organism must die. So what survives is in fact a code for something else, an 
 




image of the subject – not the subject itself. Life is survival in coded form” (ibid:16).  
That is, semiosis concerns itself with the process by which morphological reality 
operates as a complex  informational architecture comprised of both a stable model 
of information about its own organization and also many finite and diverse 
articulations of that model. It is also an adaptive architecture in that this model 
interacts with other morphologies and can, as required, constructively change itself 
– this means that it can not only change its individual units but it can change its 
general model; that is, biological systems have developed the capacity to control 
their own future. 
 
This paper will be in two parts.  
 
A. This section will attempt a brief comparison of Saussure and Peirce. It will 
contrast the Saussurian dyadic model of semiology with the Peircean triadic 
model of semiotics to explain how Peircean semiosis enables a complex 
adaptive network. 
B. This section will examine how a biological organism functions as a sign. This 
will explain how a biological system operates as an ‘informed’ and informing 
knowledge system, i.e., as a function within a complex adaptive network that 




An introduction to semiotics and a common error 
 
What is semiotics and what is a sign? 
 
 




A common definition of semiotics is  “simply the analysis of signs or the study of the 
functioning of sign systems” (Cobley and Jansz 1999:4) This tautology is not very 
helpful. After all, what is a ‘sign’?  
 
Then, there is Umberto Eco’s “Semiotics is concerned with everything that is taken 
as a sign. A sign is everything that can be taken as significantly substituting for 
something else…Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything 
which can be used in order to lie” (1976:7).  Notice the requirement for an agential 
interpreter who observes something and ‘takes it as a sign, as a substitution of 
something else’. Notice also that the ‘something else’ need not exist.  
 
The Port Royal seventeenth century school states that “the sign comprises two ideas 
– one of the thing represented – and its nature consists in exciting the second by the 
first” (Nöth 1995:21). There is some kind of connection, almost innate, where Y is 
brought to mind by viewing X.  Obviously, an observer is required. 
 
Or “semiotics involves the study of signification, but signification cannot be isolated 
from the human subject who uses it and is defined by means of it, or from the 
cultural system which generates”  (Silverman 1983:3). Notice the insistence that 
semiotics has something to do with ‘signification’ and that it operates solely within 
the human realm and is cultural rather than natural. 
 
There is the definition of semiotics as a ‘code system’, for example, in Prieto’s “the 
code which is used in a semiotic act is that semiotic structure on which the sender’s 
and receiver’s knowledge of the signals is based” (1975:129. In Nöth 1995: 210). In 
this case, the sender and receiver, two individual agents, share knowledge of a code. 
 
 




Or “ A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called 
its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands 
itself to the same Object” (Peirce CP: 2.274).  
 
Without going much further in such an encyclopedic outline, we can see some 
difficulties  with these definitions. These can be reduced to a conflict between sign 
systems based around a logic of equivalence and a logic of composition. The first, 
and the focus of all but the last of the above examples, is Saussurian semiology; the 
second, provided by the last quotation, is Peircean semiotics.  
 
A brief comparison of Saussure and Peirce 
 
Semiology 
It is vitally important, as many do not, to distinguish between the two ideologies. 
Saussure uses semiology, while Peirce uses semiotics. Despite the insistence by 
some authors of their identity, it is a serious error to equate them.  Semiology refers 
to words; that is, to sign systems created and used by human beings. As a 
descriptive methodology, it is focused around the metaphoric or symbolic 
translations of cultural phenomena, where ‘this’ means ‘that’ according to some 
socially defined lexicon.  Semiology has a straightforward agenda; it substitutes one 
word or image for another word or image; it is a ‘nominalist’ system, focused on 
‘nomen’ or names. It works with actual units, shuffling them around mechanically to 
connect them on a conceptual board. Semiotics, on the other hand, is not 
descriptive; it is analytic. It examines the formation of those actual units, or 
morphologies. Its analysis is focused on the transformative action that takes input 
data, and using normative rules, organizes this data as an output. The whole process 
of  input/organization/output is, together,  the development of a morphological 
 




unit, a sign. Semiosis, moreover, is not confined to the human conceptual process 
but produces forms or morphological realities within the physico‐chemical, 
biological and cognitive realms.   
 
As Deely points out, semiology is a subset of the whole science of semiotics, and is 
focused primarily in the literary realm (1990:2‐3).  Guiraud states  that Saussure 
“emphasizes the social function of the sign”, i.e., the symbolic artifacts of a dyadic 
metaphor  or code and referent (1975:5) where A stands for C . Barthes states that 
semiology finds “language (in the ordinary sense of the term) in its path, not only as 
a model, but also as a component” (1967:10‐11). As Saussure notes, his analysis is 
confined to human processes, and in particular, to the symbolic, for “language is a 
system of signs that expresses ideas, and is therefore comparable to writing, to the 
deaf‐mute alphabet, to symbolic rites, to codes of good manners, to military signals, 
etc. …A science that studies the life of signs in society is therefore conceivable; it 
would be a part of general psychology; we shall call it semiology” (1964: 33). 
 
The Saussurian semiological act is dyadic and mechanical. This means that there are 
two nodal sites in the interaction, which are termed the signifier and the signified. 
Or more simply, the stimulus (the sound of the word, the image as a signal), and our 
interpretation of that stimulus.  Furthermore,  “both terms must exist” in their own 
right (Deely 1990:23).  The two units are both existentially real and all that 
semiology is doing is connecting the two. This dyadic structure obviously requires an 
external authoritative ‘metanarrative’ or codebook and an agent using this 
codebook to bring these two nodes in contact.  
 
The Saussurian analysis enables a cultural description of social systems; that is, it 
enables the researcher to explore how human beings have constructed their culture 
to imbue natural and artificial objects, and beliefs and behavior, with social 
 




meanings.  As a dyadic descriptive framework, it focuses on that authoritative agent 
or the “systems of signification” (Barthes 1967:9) that connect the two ‘real objects’, 
the sound and the meaning, the object and the meaning.  Peirce wrote this about 
the dyad, “Let me remind you of the distinction referred to above between 
dynamical, or dyadic, action; and intelligent, or triadic action. An event, A, may, by 
brute force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B, may in its turn produce a 
third event, C….  Each step of it concerns a pair of objects” (CP: 5.472).  
 
In a dyadic semiological or nominalist frame, there are two actual units. An external 
agent  then provides an intentional connection between the two. This means that a 
Saussurian analysis lends itself readily to theories of the authoritative domination of 
this agent, viewed as the metanarrative, whether it be parents, employers, 
corporations, government or social customs  (Lyotard 1984). The Saussurian analytic 
frame enthusiastically lent itself to the postmodern attempt to deconstruct this 
‘metanarrative’ and supposedly return human consciousness to direct connections 
with the object, a naïve notion of essentialist purity. Semiology is best understood 
within a nominalist perspective,  where the focus is on the socially defined meanings 
of objects and people. It operates as a descriptive outline of assigned meanings, 
beliefs and behavior, and has no capacity to examine the generation of 




Semiosis is a triadic frame, and there are not three units but three relations. 
Semiosis is “an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three 
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri‐relative influence not 
being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs” (Peirce CP: 5.484). The 
Peircean semiotic frame consists of three relations:  input, mediation and output. 
 




“The fact is the subject, the resulting idea is the predicate and the mediative 
connection is thought” (CP:1.485).  This triadic process is irreducible; all three 
relations are a requirement for the morphological unit, which is understood as a 
whole, the semiosic sign,  which can be understood as a spatiotemporal form, a 
‘morpheme’. A further point to focus on, is that the mediative connection is not 
random but is an act of reason; it is an ‘informed action’. 
 
The triadic process is best understood as a function where f(x)=y. 1This simply 
means that x, the object or input, is transformed by means of the mediative rules of 
f into y or output.  Or, a bacterium absorbs nutrients (x, object) and transforms them 
by means of its internal rules (f) into its own ‘interpretant’ reality (y).  All bacteria of 
a set or type operate according to these common rules f and therefore, all will, more 
or less, interact with that particular x in the same way. As a triadic function, the sign 
exists as a complete ‘morpheme’ linked within a network to other signs.  
Semiosis is the science of morphology, the generation of forms. It has nothing to do 
with ‘names’ or nominalism; its focus is on the generation of the existential form, 
made up of an interaction of three relations, that can last for a nanosecond or a 
millennium. The generation or the sign is a process of matter becoming informed or 
rationally organized within both a typological and a particular morphology. 
 
The transformative mediative relation of ‘f’ in the semiosic function is a major key to 
understanding semiosis and we will be analyzing this function within this paper 
under the theme of anticipation. This process of mediation is an act of generalizing , 
an act of reason that synthesizes or normalizes the disparate informational qualities 
of particulars to provide a ‘general’ or ‘universal’ that enables individual units to 
maintain cohesive membership in a community, a set, a species.  The ‘general’ is a 
                                                 
1 Peirce discusses functions, as ‘an operation performed on the arguments’ and the concept of a 
transformation from x to y in CP: 4.250-255. 
 




commonality that acts as a future‐oriented law, for “every habit has, or is, a general 
law. Whatever is truly general refers to the indefinite future…. The past is actual 
fact. But a general…cannot be fully realized. It is a potentiality” (Peirce CP: 2.148). 
Mediation acts as a set of evolving normative habits that is, in addition,  adaptive, 
for it is “ capable of a definite increase in knowledge” (CP:5.311). As such a forward‐
looking law, the general functions as a referential template that anticipates the 
articulation of the individual unit and as such, guides and constrains its 
morphological emergence. 
 
The Peircean Sign as a Biological Function 
 
The genuine sign is a triadic process, an action made up of a logical process of three 
relations – an   input stimuli, a mediative process that uses general rules to process 
and interpret this input data, resulting in an output or interpretation. The whole 
triad of f(x)=y acts as a single morphological reality, the Sign. This triad is an 
irreducible set of relations. It is not, as in the Saussurian frame, three separate 
existential ‘things’, i.e., separate input data, separate Rules, separate interpretation. 
Again, the Peircean Sign is a process of f(x)=y where input x is mediated and 
transformed by the rules f, to produce an interpretant y.   
Importantly, the mediation is an act of reason. We must insist on this; mediation is 
not a mechanical act nor is it an act of communication. It is an analytic act. As Peirce 
noted, “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more 
deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really 
there…. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there” (CP:4.551).  
That is, the mediative rules that govern this ‘informed organization of matter’, in the 
biological world, are an act of reason – not random or kinetic mechanics.  
Furthermore, they are not fixed; they develop, they evolve. This triadic analytic 
 




process is the fundamental infrastructure of our world, for “so prolific is the triad in 
forms that one may easily conceive that all the variety and multiplicity of the 
universe springs from it” (CP:4.310). 
 
Semiosis then becomes aligned with the algebraic study of both functions where 
f(x)=y and calculus – which studies the nature of the rules f (or limits, 
constraints) put upon x, the input, as the rules transform it to an interpretation.  
Essentially, this means that the rules about the transformation of x, the input, have a 
limited capacity to carry out that transformation. If the input is more than the rules 
can handle, then x, the input,  dissipates. The rules cannot process that input. The 
biological realm has developed strategies to prevent the threat of a constant 
entropic dissipation of energy and has enabled its systems to accept and process 
more and more diverse matter. Biological systems have acquired the capacity to 
evolve and adapt their morphological rules of transformation of input to output, so 
that they can continue producing material morphologies, even if these are different 
morphologies. As Peirce noted,  the biological realm is non‐linear, for “matter 
entirely  foreign to the premises may appear in the conclusion” (CP:3.641). The 
realm with the least capacity to change its rules, and therefore, the realm with the 
least complex morphologies, as well as being more subject to individual entropic 
dissipation,  is the physico‐chemical realm.  
 
The biological realm exploded in morphological diversity and complexity of form 
because it moved its mediative or transformative function into the internal control 
of subsets of the realm, i.e., into the control of species and even subsets and sub‐
subsets of species. Locating the definition and nature of its mediative rules within 
multiple levels of subsets whose behavior was defined by local pressures, meant 
that those subsets reorganized their rules only according to their local 
environmental requirements. This multi‐faceted architecture provided a local 
 




accountability and flexibility that reduced a requirement for massive general rule 
reorganization and resulted, as well, in an increased complexity and diversity of 
rules. This produced an exponential explosion of diversity of forms and a resultant 
reduction of entropy as diverse morphologies developed with their own specific 
local rules to process matter to myriad forms.   As an aside, it should be noted that 
the human realm has moved the mediative rules out of the physical and into the 
symbolic; its rules are therefore totally arbitrary and extremely flexible.  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that a semiosic analysis, using the Peircean triadic 
analysis of Relations, can be used to constructively explain the self‐organizing and 




How a biological organism functions as a sign 
   
Matter is primal and universal but exists only when it takes on form (Thompson 
[1917]1966). Morphological production occurs within a topological structure, a 
network, which is made up of morphological forms (nodes) which are interactive 
with other forms/nodes. The system of nodes and interactions forms another level 
of reality, a network.  Networks, in the physical, chemical, biological, neural, 
economic, informational and social systems, are increasingly being extensively 
studied (Albert and Barabási 2002, Barabási 2002, Barabási and Albert 1999, Castells 
2000, Christensen and Albert 2007, Christensen et al 2007, Newman et al 2006, 
Watts 1999)  and as noted, are found in all realms, the physico‐chemical, biological 
and hominid. For example, “living systems form a huge genetic network, whose 
vertices are proteins and genes, the edges representing the chemical interactions 
between them” (Barabási and Albert, 1999: 2). The nervous system is a network 
 




“whose vertices are the nerve cells, connected by axons” (ibid). Societies are 
networks, “where vertices are individuals or organizations, and the edges 
characterize the social interactions between them” (ibid).  Signs exist only in  
networks; however, the focus in this paper is on the formation only of the sign, 
rather than the formation of the networks. 
  
The analytic model used to examine this morphological function, the sign, is a two‐
dimensional Cartesian coordinate quadrant (Fig. 1 and Taborsky 2006).  I’ll make a 
few preliminary comments about this graph. First, the two quadrants on the right 
hand side, quadrants I and IV are understood to operate in external space, local and 
non‐local. This is the space of classical mechanics, the realm of our basic everyday 
experience and the foundation of most of our science. The two quadrants on the left 
side, Quadrants II and III operate in internal space, local and non‐local. This is 
quantum space. It is a basic axiom of this theory that the two realms, the internal 
and external are not in an ‘either‐or’ situation but are embedded within and 
necessary to each other.  
 
In this paper, I will focus on anticipation, as operative within the relations of 
Quadrants III and IV, which are understood respectively as strong and weak 
anticipation. ‘Strong anticipation refers to an anticipation of events generated by 
the system itself. Weak anticipation refers to an anticipation of events predicted or 
forecasted from a model of a system’ (Dubois 2000a). 
 
Following Dubois, anticipation is a property not merely of the biological realm, as 
Rosen (1985) affirmed,  but of all systems, physical, biological and social. “As 
anticipatory properties exist in fundamental physical systems…anticipation must be 
a key property for any non‐living and living systems which are more complex, like 
physical, chemical, biochemical, ecological, economical, social systems” (Dubois 
 




2000a:28). Anticipation refers to the establishment and operation of symmetry 
inducing normative habits of morphological formation. “Anticipation is not only 
related to predictions but to decisions: hyperincursive systems create multiple 
choices and a decision process selects one choice. So, anticipation is not a final goal, 
like in cybernetics and system science, but is a fundamental property of physical and 
biological systems” (Dubois, Abstract, 2000a). What this means is that a semiosic 
system has the capacity to, itself, create multiple hypothetical or imaginary ‘virtual 
visions’ or simulations of its nature and behavior in its environment. These imaginary 
states, which we call ‘strong anticipation’ enable the system to anticipate the 
actualization of these states and on the basis of these simulations, make an 
informed choice about which organizational mode is ‘the best solution’ for that 
environment. After this decision is made and a mode of organization is actualized, 
the biological system then has the additional capacity to develop an abstract model 
of this organizational mode, which Dubois defines as ‘weak anticipation’, and retain 
that model as a governing referential guide that steers the morphologies of  
developing individuals within that system.  
 
Questions within this area include the nature and relevance of these two types of 
anticipation, the ability of a system to develop and reject anticipative capacities, and 
the relation between strong anticipation and  the growth of complexity. The 
development of a complex and evolving capacity for anticipation and the 
concomitant capacity of the system to itself make decisions about its future 
morphological state is a primary characteristic of the development of the biological 
realm from the physico‐chemical realm. The reality of two types of anticipation 
suggests that the two step evolutionary framework of neodarwinism (Fisher 1930, 
Mayr 1942) – a framework that rejects anticipation and is instead based around a 
primary random or uninformed mutation of a single model supported by a post hoc 
‘natural selection’ of that model – is  an inadequate analysis. The semiosic biological 
 




system is not a random or mechanical process but an informed, reasoned and self‐
controlled process. 
 
The Model of the Semiosic Process 
 
The analytic model,  a two‐dimensional Cartesian coordinate quadrant, enables a 
morphological analysis that acknowledges differential spatial and temporal 
parameters of measurement. The ontological and epistemological ‘cuts’ 
(Atmanspacher 1994, 1999, Primas 1993), which are modeled respectively as the 
vertical Y and horizontal X axes, establish measurement parameters for six unique 
topological interactions termed  relations.  
 
 
              
 
FIGURE 1.  The Cartesian Quadrant. 
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A relation is an existential string. It is a primitive morphology, where two nodes 
functioning as horizons of influence, which is to say, as horizons of measurement, 
establish a configuration, a morpheme of data functioning within a unique time and 
space – and mode. Again, a relation is a construct developed within a pair of 
‘functors’ or mapping measurements which set up a structure‐preserving primitive 
form, a linear string.  I have found it difficult to offer a clear name for this string.  I 
have frequently referred to it as a dyad because the string exists within those  two 
nodes of measurement; however, this term is inappropriate because it suggests two 
existential realities when I am referring to only one. Perhaps a better choice might 
be to call it a singlet. 2 I only wish to assert that reality exists in such a primal form; 
however, I will further claim that such an existential string, although it exists ‘as 
such’, cannot do so in isolation. Reality requires that these strings function within an 
ordered triadic form. 
The semiosic process selects three of these singlets from the six relations, which it 
then sets up as a triadic function f(x)=y of three relations. This entire function is one 
morphological reality, a sign,  and operates as input/mediation/output, with ‘f’ 
understood as the mediative act of transformation from input sensate data to 
output interpretation (Taborsky 2006).  
 
The vertical ontological Y cut, a result, in the physical and biological realms, of 
temperature differentiation, demarcates spatial experience into internal and 
external spatial values. Internal space provides an irreducible mass of data and 
external space provides a reducible discreteness of data.  
 
The horizontal epistemological X cut sets up a hierarchical level; it differentiates 
between local (individual) spatial values and non‐local global (communal) spatial 
values. This cut ensures that morphological realities are capable of interaction with 
                                                 
2 Peirce refers to a ‘singlet’ in a different outline, to refer to an object ‘as such’ (CP:4.345). 
 




other forms not simply in a random kinetic manner which would be all that would be 
possible within a local or individual definition, but, due to the hierarchical authority 
of general or common identities, these morphologies are capable of cohesive 
interaction with each other because their composition includes information 
organized within the collective laws of shared typologies rather than the 
peculiarities of individuals. With this cut, which acts as the introduction of the 
temporal parameters of present, perfect and progressive time (Matsuno 1998, 
1999), we now have an analytic scheme of four quadrants, I, II, III and IV [Figure 1]. 
 
I add two further relations to the quadrant, namely, the aspatial and atemporal 
universal property of pure imagination, and the interface relation located at the 
coordinate origin, which brings the relational acts to six in total (Table 1).  
        
 Seven Measurements 
The morphological architecture has seven basic measurements: internal and 
external space; local and global space; and present, perfect and progressive time.  
 
     Internal spatial measurements produce morphologies that act without horizons; 
internally organized matter is unable to recognize boundaries and cannot ‘see’ or 
react to otherness.  This type of information is high energy and rapidly dissipative. 
When linked to other measurements that inhibit its dissipation by establishing 
boundaries, its expansive and undirected energy activities promote rapid and 
sometimes novel interactions with other data.   
    External spatial measurements establish horizons or limits and enable definitive 
values of the informational identity of a morpheme. The membrane of a cell acts as 
an information closure; its perimeters define the extent of the immediate control 
that the cell has over its internal information.   
 




    Local spatial measurements set up non‐distributed actions; i.e., two different 
proteins can maintain their differences even when they work in contextual 
cooperation.   
    Global or non‐local spatial measurements distribute a property as general 
information among a set. These distributed values permit symmetry‐inducing 
properties within that collective, e.g., enabling interactions amongst particular units 
as well as enabling a continuity of morphological type of a species.  
 
Time is not a universal abstract measurement (Newtonian/Galilean linear time) but 
is a restricted measurement functioning as a compositional property of the 
morphological reality. There are three different temporal measurements which 
produce three different morphological realities (Matsuno 1998, 1999).  
Present time measures a reality that functions within now time without links or 
references, without past or future. The information provided by the morphological 
measurement of pure present time operates only in internal and local or isolate 
space. An example is a ‘feeling of heat’ without consciousness of that feeling.   
Perfect time moulds experience within distinct asymmetrical parameters, i.e., as 
‘this’ instantiation differentiated from ‘that’ instantiation. It enables individual 
kinetic interactions and comparisons and operates in external and local or closed 
space.  
Progressive time establishes values within generalized continuity; it has no capacity 
to describe an individual state whether in present or perfect time but can deal only 
with  commonalities operating as a general attributes. It operates within global or 
open space and both internally and externally. 
 
These seven measurements operate within the dynamics of asymmetry and 
symmetry. Local space and present and perfect time contribute to asymmetry, i.e., 
 




to differentiation of form and relation; global space and progressive time contribute 
to symmetry, i.e., to communal cohesion and continuity. 
 
Mode is a value that refers to the style of connection that relations have with each 
other. The connection can be either of potential, actual or necessary use. A potential 
use implies an optional use, an actual use defines a genuine use of that 
measurement; a necessary use implies a required use of the measurement.   
 
    The Real, the Imaginary, the Finite, the Infinite 
 
The X and Y cuts set up negative and positive values that explain a morphological 
capacity for four different types of behavior – the imaginary, the real, the local and 
the non‐local. The ‘real’ is shown on the right‐hand side of the quadrant; its 
measurements, both local and non‐local, are discrete and statistical. Whether 
measuring the particular unit or an abstract model, its actions are mechanical, as in 
Rosen’s outline of the simple system (1991). Neodarwinism is focused exclusively on 
the mechanical or right side of the quadrant; that is, the local and the non‐local in 
external space. Darwin “moved biology into a Newtonian framework” (Brooks and 
Wiley 1988:xii). The imaginary, on the left side, the internal realm, both local and 
non‐local, provides hypothetical measurements – both of which are rejected in a 
neodarwinian analysis. 
   
 
 




        TABLE 1.  The Six Relations: Code/Space/Time/Function  
 
      Note: The relations are defined using Peircean terminology  (Degenerate Cases  1.525‐
537) 
 
     THE RELATIONS 
2‐2 in Quad I External Local Perfect Time Discrete Actual 
Information 
1‐1 in Quad II 
 
Internal Local Present Time Possible Information 



















3‐3 Aspatial Atemporal Universal Logic 
    
Again, a relation is a string, a primitive morphology, where two nodes functioning as 
horizons of influence establish a configuration, a morpheme of data functioning 
within a particular time and a particular space – and mode. Relations are real but 
they cannot exist on their own; they only exist within a triadic function, the Sign. 
 
  The Local Relations: Internal and External 
 
 




Two of the relations define local realities, both internal and external. These two 
relations are modeled in the upper half of the Cartesian quadrant  
 
     Relation 1‐1 Quadrant II 
 
The most basic and primitive relation, is found in quadrant II. The relation is coded, 
using Peircean terminology, as 1‐1 or Firstness as Firstness. This means that the two 
nodes are both operating within Firstness. Firstness is a relation of possibility, of 
freedom, where “the free is that which has not another behind it, determining its 
actions” (Peirce CP: 1.302) but is “a state, which is in its entirety in every moment of 
time as long as it endures” (1.307). Matter in this state is ‘perfectly simple and 
without parts” (CP:1.531). This relation moulds reality without boundaries, as an 
isolate state, in internal and local space and present time. Given that this data exists 
without perimeters, it allows a wide number of degrees of freedom of interpretation 
(output) and the emergence of novelty of ultimate form by virtue of the relatively 
unformed and ambiguous nature of its content. The functionality of this relation, 
i.e., its nature and horizons of influence, is the expansion of freedom of 
morphological innovation or interpretation by means of  the vagueness of its data 
content. An example would be a sensation of ‘hotness’ which can then be 
transformed into the specifics of either a malfunctioning furnace or a fever. It could 
be a provision of a number of chemical properties; the provision might promote the 
development of specific tactics in the cell to accept or reject those properties or 
even, form them into a specific morphology. This measurement acknowledges only 
that there is an input of unexamined data located internally in local space and 
present time. It can be transformed into discrete usable information by the semiosic 
act which must measure and stabilize its energy content by linking it to two other 
relations; otherwise, its data and energy content will rapidly dissipate. 
  
 




It is an important relation, confirming the veracity of chance and freedom in the 
universe. The relation contributes highly unstable, possibly usable but indecisive 
data, enabling an information system to explore a variety of options – typical and 
atypical – as it selects a specific direction of interpretation.  Because the matter is 
measured only within present time and local and internal space, its data content will 
be brief and will dissipate rapidly if the system does not link that content to a 
specific direction of interpretation. As such, this relation, despite its expansive 
capacity, cannot destabilize an entire system     
  
Relation 2‐2, Quadrant I 
 
Measurements in the relation of 2‐2 or Secondness‐as‐Secondness provide data 
operating in external and local space and perfect time; as such, the data is 
differentiated,  it is closed, for “constraint is a Secondness” (Peirce CP: 1.325) and 
we view it as ‘real’ or actual. Any discrete entity, from a rock to a word, can be 
considered an example of this ‘definitive definitiveness’ of containment and 
contiguity and it is the basis of most of our daily experiences; for “the idea of second 
is predominant in the ideas of causation and of statical force” (CP:1.325);  it is 
facticity, it is the quantitative basis of Newtonian kinetic or reactive mechanics. The 
information in this measurement, operating only within discrete perfect time, local 
space, external space, is capable only of random and kinetic connections. There is no 
collective law that unites the particular and permits a commonality of behavior and 
therefore, no continuity of data or possibility of collaboration. Information provided 
by this relation will dissipate rapidly, not due to its own inherent vagueness as 
within the 1‐1 relation in quadrant II, but by means of the reactive damage of 
unregulated and random kinetic interactions.   
  
 




How are the energy‐dissipating problems of these two relations of local spatial 
values and immediate temporality dealt with?  By the provision of relations that 
measure time and space within symmetrical or continuity‐promoting values. We 
move to the lower level of the Cartesian quadrant. 
 
Non‐Local Measurements and the Function of Anticipation 
 
The two quadrants produced by the epistemological cut, the X cut, introduce non‐
local or global space and temporal synergy; in particular, this cut permits open (as 
differentiated from isolate and closed) interactions and a progressive and 
continuous time measurement. What we now have is a bileveled architecture, 
enabling both metabolic individual reactive processes in quadrants I and II, and 
reproductive or synthesizing and continuous common processes in quadrants III and 
IV. The measurements in quadrants III and IV provide distributed values that ensure 
the typological continuity of particular forms and the development of common 
habits, of general laws, of regularities of morphological forms. These values, which 
Peirce understands as the capacity of representation (CP:1.532) act as symmetry‐
inducing constraints to guide and inhibit the emergent local, individual instantiations 
developing in the local level (quadrants I and II) in present or perfect time. 
 
The measurements in quadrants III and IV provide two versions of compressed 
information. Information that is compressed or condensed has removed variations 
and provides information only about commonalities or common habits that operate 
as general rules of formative processes. These function to guide the emergence and 
development of individual morphologies and thus enable anticipatory predictions. 
Our world cannot function within only the two top level quadrants of 
undifferentiated matter and discrete closed particulars, for this would reduce 
behavior to kinetic randomness. There must be a function that provides 
 




morphological symmetry and reproductive continuity. The X‐cut establishes this 
function and ensures an open system. However, as Brooks notes, “evolutionary 
theory has never fully come to grips with apparent lawlike behavior in biological 
systems” (1988:3).  
 
It should be noted that a non‐local relation, which provides those common rules to 
induce symmetry, can never operate as or by itself. It has no capacity to exist, as 
itself, in present and perfect ‘now’ time because it operates in progressive or 
continuous time. It has no capacity to exist in ‘this’ or local space, as a discrete 
entity, because it operates in non‐local space. We must not “fall into the 
contradiction of making the Mediate immediable” (Peirce CP: 5.289). That, in 
common parlance, is Platonic Idealism, it is idolatry. The properties of the non‐local 
relation are active only when the relation is connected to a local relation in present 
or perfect time. 
 
With the use of either or both of these two relations of generality, the 
morphological system can anticipate. Anticipation refers to the capacity to envisage 
future states, either as hypothetical graphic networks or as abstract models; these 
simulations allow the system to analyze its possible future properties and behavior 
without taking the risks of experiencing that actuality in real time and space. This 
derived information guides its choices and actions to enable its future states to be 
productive rather than destructive (Dubois 2000a, 2000b, 2002).  
 
    
Relation 3‐2 Quadrant III 
Relation 3‐2, or Thirdness‐as‐Secondness,  functions in internal and global or non‐
local space and progressive time. One node operates within Thirdness, the other 
 




node operates within Secondness. This relation operates as a ‘virtual information 
processor’. Ontologically and epistemologically, its measurements are completely 
negative rather than positive. It is best described, mathematically, as a ‘purely 
imaginary number’, i.e., a compressed or squared imaginary number (i squared). 
However, it can only become operational when operating as a complex number, i.e., 
when linked to real number measurements that occur within local spatial 
perimeters. It functions as a heuristic process to come up with a number of 
hypothetical or imaginary solutions to environmental stimuli, an ‘irrational plurality’ 
of correlates or connections (Peirce CP: 5.70) This is not a model; a model abstracts 
from actual existences and then generalizes the nature of this reality. This is a strong 
anticipatory process (Dubois 2000a), which does not model actual sensory data but 
instead graphically outlines multiple probable future interactions in the 
environment, based on a cumulative series of informational searches within that 
environment (Dubois 2000a,b, 2002). The process can be described as providing 
“network motifs – patterns of connection that recur statistically more frequently 
than they would in a degree‐preserving randomized graph” (Christensen and Albert 
2007:8). That is, the hypothetical solutions of strong anticipation are not ‘things’ or 
models of ‘things’; they are maps of networked connections in the environment. 
Pribram (in Dubois, 2000a) asks, ‘how can an anticipatory hypothesis be modeled 
without a future defined goal’? And the answer was “a hyperincursive anticipatory 
system generates multiple potential states at each time step and corresponds to 
one‐to‐many relations. A selection parameter must be defined to select a particular 
state amongst these multiple potential states. These multiple potential states 
collapse to one state (amongst these states) which becomes the actual state” 
(Dubois 2000a: 28‐29).  And that is the key – the system itself, operating as a process 
of local and non‐local exploration, provides multiple imaginary solutions – those 
graphed states of interaction – any one of which may be successful; which one is 
 




ultimately ‘selected’ for actual use may be due to chance, acknowledging the 
existence of free will or Aristotle’s spontaneity in the universe. Dubois continues 
“the selection process of states to be actualized amongst the multiple potential 
states is independent of the fundamental dynamics of the brain, independent of 
initial conditions and so completely unpredictable (and computable)…the free will 
means that we can choose a state amongst the multiple potential states emerging 
from the preceding already actualized states….free will does not mean that the mind 
can make what he wants but that he can choose amongst multiple possible choices” 
(2000a: 29). The point is – and this is an important point – that any one of these 
multiple states that are ‘offered’ to the system by this process of strong anticipation 
may function and flourish. Bongard et al’s outline of robust robots is “a robot that 
actively chooses which action to perform next on the basis of its current set of 
hypothesized self‐models has a better chance of successfully inferring its own 
morphology than a robot that acts randomly” (2006:1120).  
 
Furthermore, this search process provides a data base with the capacity to evolve. If 
we use an example of this relation, the internet search engine, we find that “search 
engines entertain a model of the Internet that evolves with the Internet” (Wouters, 
Helsten, Leydesdorff 2004, emphasis added). Because it operates as an 
informational network that is indifferent to local space and time “the past in the 
Internet is constantly overwritten by the search engines” [and] “ the present, from 
where the data is collected, affects search results considerably…[and the system is 
acting to] continuously reconstruct the past by updating their indices”  (Wouters, 
Helsten, Leydesdorff 2004).  Mathematically, we can refer to the strong anticipatory 
or virtual mode as a provisory of complex information, in that it includes both real 
propensities or real numbers, which we can understand as actual memories, and 
imaginary propensities or imaginary numbers, which we can understand as the 
relational propensities with other morphologies both unformed and formed. The 
 




search process acts as an open non‐linear non‐historical catalogue of solution 
concepts, as an evolving networked ‘search engine’ of any and all links within the 
past and current, direct and indirect, experience of the community.  These links 
might not develop into actual rules of morphological formation (i.e., functioning in 
quadrant IV); however, their virtual existentiality remains extant – for a while – and 
the graphic solution may continue to be available for potential selection by another 
emerging instantiation before being overwritten by the data from new searches. 
This relation is essential in enabling a system to constructively adapt and evolve and 
is an overlooked and vital mode of measurement. 
 
This is an analytic, not modeling, process designed to explore data, accessed both 
directly and indirectly in search of actual and possible patterns and/or systematic 
relationships between variables. How does it operate? Multivariate exploratory 
techniques designed specifically to identify patterns in multivariate (or univariate, 
such as sequences of measurements) data sets select subsets of predictors from a 
large list of candidate predictors without assuming that the relationships between 
the predictors and the dependent or outcome variables of interest are linear or  
monotone. The 3‐2 relation acts as a flexible continuous networking process rather 
than as a fixed model. For example, the use of genetic algorithms, evolutionary or 
genetic programming acts as a complex and changeable set of exploratory flexible 
connections of indexical links past and present, direct and indirect, to both real and 
imaginary solutions (Beyer 1998, Goldberg 1989, Holland 1975). The genetic 
algorithm process works to identify systematic relations between variables, offering 
them as hypothetical future paths. It operates through a number of exploratory and 
evolving steps to come up with a number of ‘best solutions’. Another example of the 
3‐2 relation is the data mining process which browses massive data bases to search 
out correlations or patterns using a variety of tactics, refining these patterns into 
multiple hypothetical solutions. Then, the system will itself select one of these 
 




solutions to move into the external reality as its ‘proposed model’. Again, 
“hyperincursion systems create multiple choices and a decision process selects one 
choice” (Dubois 2000a abstract).  
 
These solutions are presented, not as models – the definition of ‘model’ will be 
restricted to an abstract image derived from actualities – but as hypothetical 
networks or ‘maps of possible interactions’.  Strong anticipation will develop a 
number of such hypothetical network maps; these maps may well include outliers or 
infrequent contact points that would degrade the current robustness of a network if 
that mapping was currently chosen by the system but those contacts might be 
useful at a later time. This 3‐2 relation provides a system with an immense capacity 
to ‘browse’ the informational community, both the near and far environment, it 
enables a system to operate in the unaccountable freedom of the imagination, by 
operating as a ‘virtual search processor’. As a global relation, its measurements are 
distributed in space; it completely ignores spatial distances. As internal, these ‘maps 
of interaction’ remain hypothetical or imaginary rather than actual and, importantly,  
do not compromise the system’s current functionality. As temporally progressive, 
the relation links past to future morphologies to achieve a broad exploration of 
knowledge in both its actualized and hypothetical forms.  
 
The relation provides robust, i.e., immediately functional evolutionary and adaptive 
capacities. Kauffman claims that “selection is not the sole source of order in 
organisms” (1993:xiv), and there are “critical limits to the power of selection” 
(1993:xv). As a network, it provides a wide range of prospective solutions for the 
system to, in interaction with its informational environment, select as the ‘best 
solution’. This rejects the Darwinian axiom that a model itself, as a final program, 
emerges randomly and survives by a reproductive struggle of its individual 
representatives.  Initially, the single solution resulting from a 3‐2 exploratory search 
 




is theoretically, randomly or freely ‘chosen’. This randomness, however, is reduced 
as the relation gathers and ‘fine‐tunes’ future‐oriented hypothetical solutions by 
constantly comparing them with the state of its current informational identity and 
the state of its current environment. This means that it is an informed and analytic, 
rather than random and ignorant, search.  The ‘best solution’, again, is a result of an 
informational process which first develops a co‐domain of hypothetical propositions, 
and then, negotiates between these prospective solutions and the environment, to 
select  the ‘best solution’. “A strong anticipatory system is one in which the 
anticipated future state is ‘generated by the system itself” (Dubois 2000a:4).  Any 
randomness is internal and reduced to zero by the time a ‘best solution’ is chosen by 
the system. The emergent model is immediately functional and there is no testing by  
struggle as required in the thesis of Natural Selection. 
 
Relation 3‐1 Quadrant IV 
 
Quadrant IV measures matter in external and non‐local or global space and 
progressive time. Functioning in external or actualized space, it lacks the imaginary 
propensities of the internal mode. It is coded as 3‐1 or Thirdness‐as‐Firstness, which 
operates as a ‘qualitative Thirdness’ (Peirce CP: 5.72). 
 
It operates as an abstract model, or weak anticipation,  a derived representation of 
reality. In this relation, the model is the statistical average of the already‐actualized 
individual morphological forms existent within measurements that include local 
space and perfect time, i.e., measurements that include the relation of 2‐2. That is, 
this relation models a known landscape, relying on existent sensory data. It acts to 
constrain the variability of emerging forms by confining population reproduction 
within a dominant referential model (the statistical average) acting within a basic 
Bell Curve or a Power Law. As Kauffman said "in sufficiently complex systems, 
 




selection cannot avoid the order exhibited by most members of the ensemble" 
(1993:16). This referential model functions as a kind of 'attractor‐glue' (Paton & 
Matsuno 1998) to which the emerging nascent instantiations are attracted, and 
which they then take as a default guide for their development. 
 
An abstract model is comparable to Rosen’s description of “an anticipatory system is 
a system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its environment, which 
allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions 
pertaining to a later instant” (1985: 341). Following Dubois, this relation “deals with 
weak anticipation, because the anticipation is based on a model of the system and 
thus is a model‐based prediction and not a system‐based prediction” (Dubois 2000a: 
4). A model exists on a secondary level of reality; it is a post hoc abstraction, albeit, 
in the biological realm, derived by the system itself rather than by an external agent 
and embedded within its morphology as compressed data (DNA). As such, this is 
‘mathematical reasoning’ or deduction,  which can be understood as “constructing a 
diagram according to a general percept, in observing certain relations between parts 
of that diagram not explicitly required by the percept, showing that these relations 
will hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this conclusion in general terms” 
(Peirce CP: 1.54).  As an abstraction existing in progressive time, it is protected for a 
certain period from variations emerging within the degrees of freedom that arise 
within the actual local‐space experiences. That is, deviations from this model, i.e., 
actual particular or living variations, would have to reach a critical threshold of 
statistical value before the temporally slower modeling process of the 3‐1 relation 
acknowledged their existence in its model. 
 
If we examine this relation within the biological realm, we find that a dominant 
model enables a stable ecosystem. As Brooks points out, “natural selection and 
other proximal factors are primarily rate‐limiting and not direction‐giving 
 




constraints” (1988:xii). 3The ecosystem cannot waste its energy by constantly having 
to adapt to myriad new individual morphologies.  Natural Selection operates as a 
model, as weak anticipation, for its model emerges within an external “struggle for 
existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with the 
individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life” (Darwin 1963: 
51). “Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest” (ibid:64), can be understood as 
the “preservation of favourable individual differences and variations, and the 
destruction of those which are injurious” (ibid:64). That is, natural selection 
operates as a statistical average of already‐actualized realities. 
 
Are these two Darwinian steps of randomly generated individual morphological 
units and a post hoc selection of the ‘fittest’ of these individuals for reproduction,  a 
valid explanation of the development of a dominant model?  As Peirce notes, “the 
universe is not a mere mechanical result of the operations of blind law” (CP:1.160). 
Although I agree that a dominant model emerges, I reject the Darwinian explanation 
of model dominance as due to a ‘struggle against other types’ and I reject the 
causality of emergence of the actual model as due to random ‘slight variations 
within individuals’. There are different reasons for the functionality of the model 
and for the emergence of variation. 
 
The operative strength of the weak anticipation model developed in this quadrant is 
predetermined by means of the measurements of the relation 3‐2 in Quadrant III 
prior to the emergence of any individuals using that model. The 3‐2 relation of 
strong anticipation will develop a number of viable informational directions that can 
be used as feasible symmetry‐inducing configurations for the development of 
particular morphologies. The system will, as noted, freely ‘select’ one hypothetical 
solution. Again, any of these solutions will be functional in that environment and the 
                                                 
3 We understand the relation of 3-2 as a ‘direction-giving constraint’. 
 




other solutions remain extant as ‘virtual possibilities’. The eventual dominance of 
only one model is due to post‐emergence acts such as preferential attachment 
where a spontaneous connection sets up an habitual connection that forms the 
basis for a dominant model (Barabási and Albert 1999, Milo et al 2004,  Artzy‐
Randrup et al 2004,). The Barabási and Albert model develops itself as a nondirected 
network, which develops node by node, connecting each new node to existing ones;  
the probabilities of connections grows by preferential attachment, i.e., by existent 
connections and therefore “large networks self‐organize into a scale‐free state” 
(1999: 2). Another post‐emergence basis for one‐model dominance is proximate 
cause, where spatial closeness of existent individuals privileges connections. A 
dominant referential model emerges, not as an a priori determination but as a post 
hoc constructed abstraction of a serviceable and efficient interaction. The key point 
is that the first choice of this operational design which then develops as a dominant 
model is made within the strong anticipatory processes of the relation 3‐2 in 
Quadrant III, prior to the actual post hoc domination of that model.  
 
That is, this relation of 3‐1, a process of weak anticipation, in differentiation to 
Darwinian Natural Selection theory,  does not have the capacity to solve a problem, 
only to ensure the domination of a chosen solution. Solving the problem remains 
with the internal mode of strong anticipation, the relation of 3‐2. However, this 3‐1 
measurement constrains the emergence of novel properties among the community, 
for the existing reproductive aggregate is maintained as the governing model. 
Peripheral variations may appear but are not admitted to the modeling calculations 
of the prevailing model and thus, fail to reproduce in sufficient strength to overcome 
that model.  
 
As a symmetry‐inducing action, this relation is vital to maintaining the strength of 
actualized representations of information, enabling this type of information; that is, 
 




the actual, to dominate imaginary or hypothetical constructs. 4This is an important 
concept – actual measurements must dominate imaginary measurements; actual 
morphologies must prevail over imaginary morphologies. Rather than using the 
common and derogative term of ‘machine’ to refer to these  two external relations 
of Relation 2‐2 and Relation 3‐1, we might instead refer to these two relations as 
‘mechanical’ and conclude that no system in our universe, whether physico‐
chemical, biological or socioconceptual, is exempt nor should it be exempt from the 
robust functionality of these two mechanical relations. 
  
The Evolutionary Capacities of Anticipation: Relations 3‐2 and 3‐1 
 
Why are two Relations required for evolutionary adaptive capacities? Why can’t the 
single external Relation, 3‐1, of Natural Selection, with a model developed by chance 
and strengthened by struggle, be the answer? The problem of course, is the 
stability/plasticity dilemma, where a system develops a functional model, sets up 
that model within immune protections,  and then, meets up with new 
environmental situations which require a different behavior. That is, how can a 
system that must retain its integrity,  react to environmental uncertainty and 
demands for novel behavior? How can it take risks? If retaining the ‘best solution’ 
model and the process of deriving a ‘best solution model’ are operating in the same 
domain, then, this is an irresolvable situation. The current model will rapidly weed 
out any emergence and retention of other options by the reproductive authority of 
the current statistical average (survival of the fittest). This seemingly deadlocked 
situation is dealt with by moving the process of selecting a ‘best solution’ out of the 
model’s domain and into another domain, the internal relation of strong 
anticipation, of Quadrant III or 3‐2.  
 
                                                 
4 In the social realm, such imaginary solutions are termed ‘utopian’, which means ‘no place’. 
 




The 3‐2 process of a genetic algorithm provides a search process which offers the 
biological system several possible solutions to an environmental adaptive 
requirement – a solution is offered prior to individual morphological articulation, 
and any one of these solutions will function. The  biological system does not have to 
waste time and energy in coming up with myriad random unworkable solutions to 
environmental requirements.  If we consider the statistical nature of random 
generation, we have to conclude that by the time that a functional ‘best solution’ is 
randomly generated, the species will be long extinct. It is obvious that “in any highly 
competitive system – whether biological or industrial – the speed and efficiency of 
organization, and the sophistication of response to changing circumstances are 
critical determinants of the systems’ survival and success” (Mattick and Gagen 
2005:857). The internal domain is an analytic and informed process connected to 
direct and indirect environmental realities. These suggestions do not threaten the 
integrity of the current model operating as weak anticipation until and unless that 
current model starts to lose its robustness, until its occupants are threatened by 
environmental pressures. Then, the internal hypothetical solutions become practical 
options – and one is selected by the system itself – to become the new dominant 
model. 
 
The neodarwinian answer to this problem is that the new option appears as a result 
of a random mutation rather than an informed hypothesis. It is a basic axiom of this 
biosemiotic thesis that such a tactic is impossible. Again – by the time a 
mathematically random option appeared – the species would be extinct. Biological 
systems require stronger capacities to react to environmental pressures than 
mechanical randomness. The biological realm as a semiotic system, a complex 
adaptive network, uses both strong and weak anticipative semiosic processes. The 
two basic processes of anticipatory modeling enable the biological realm to promote 
 




a diversity of morphological evolution and thus, by preventing entropy, enable a 
robust complexity.  
 
Two Other Relations 
 
There are two other relations, 2‐1 or Secondness‐as‐Firstness and 3‐3 or Thirdness‐
as‐Thirdness. Both are important; both are less visible on the two‐dimensional 
Cartesian quadrant and merit a more intensive treatment than can be provided in 
this paper.  
 
The full imagination, 3‐3,  is aspatial and atemporal and can be understood as the 
universal rationality of pure mind, affirming that the universe, while not designed or 
in any way a priori does self‐organize energy within evolving complex, consistent, 
coherent and integrated networks.  
 
The Interface, 2‐1, a borderline relation, functions as an initial condition (origin or 
without the constraints of memory) at the point of intersection of the Y and X cuts 
of differentiation.  It operates in local space – both isolate and closed ‐ and in both 
present and perfect time. It has properties that are distinct, via its organization 
within Secondness, and that are vague, via its organization within Firstness. The 
interface can function alone or can be linked to any of the other five relations. We 
will not explore these aspects in this paper.  
 
The chaotic or strange attractor is the relation of 2‐1 alone. It operates without links 
in which case the measurement acts as an initial condition of differentiation in a 
state of high excitation. It is highly volatile and expansive (its internal spatial and 
present temporal nature) and confrontational (its disconnected external spatial and 
perfect temporal nature). If it does not find/attract symmetry inducing 
 




measurements it will dissipate. It can be understood as a relation of anticipatory 
exploratory freedom and is more frequent in complex systems. Its two different 
modes of measurement are continuously entwined in their attempt to link relations; 
therefore, external actuality is always exploring the new informational potentialities 
within internal vagueness and vice versa, and symmetry is always exploring 
asymmetry and vice versa. Within Peircean terms, it can be understood as an act of 
‘prescission’, which “is always accomplished by imagining ourselves in situations in 
which certain elements of fact cannot be ascertained" (Peirce CP 2.428). It is a highly 
charged anticipatory relation that focuses “attention to one element and neglect of 
the other” (Peirce CP 1.549).  
 
Conclusion: Biological Semiosis 
 
What does this complex morphological architecture of Six Relations provide?  First, 
the system provides an ongoing freedom of emerging morphological formation, for 
the undefined nature of internal energy within the second quadrant (1‐1) provides 
an openness to diverse informational organization. The Interface relation of 2‐1, 
with its capacity to pick up this input, define it as origin (i.e., without the constraints 
of memory) and link that unorganized content to the organizational processes of the 
other relations, enables novelty and therefore,  both evolutionary adaptability and a 
diversity of individual instantiations in the relation of 2‐2.  
 
The importance of anticipative control over incipient morphology in our semiosic 
world is shown by the fact that there are three relations that provide this function of 
reflexive analysis. There is the historical memory of the accumulated values of the 
successfully articulated collective (3‐1, a model, the statistical average); an example 
is natural selection, which focuses on and privileges an actually existent dominant 
typology. There is the networked memory of virtual propensity (3‐2), which 
 




functions as an exploratory search engine and permits tacit links which may never 
be articulated but which remain available for future morphological attempts at for‐
mation. Finally, there is the memory of rationality (3‐3), which lies, I maintain, at the 
basis of life, understood as the increasingly complex yet pragmatic logical ordering 
of energy/matter.  
 
This morphological architecture, made up of six relations integrating different 
modes of space and time and a triadic semiosic morphology, provides physical and 
biological systems with the capacity for anticipation. The system can self‐direct and 
examine and evolve the mediative rules that it uses for morphological activities.  It is 
the properties of  the anticipative semiosic relations that have enabled the biological 
realm to dominate our planet. 
 
References: 
Albert, R. and A‐L. Barabási (2002). “Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks”, 
 Reviews of Modern Physics 74, 47‐97. 
Artzy‐Randrup, Y. and S. Fleishman, N. Ben‐Tal, L. Stone (2004). “Comment on 
 Network Motifs: Simple Building Blocks of Complex Networks” and 
 “Superfamilies of Evolved and Designed Networks”, Science 305, 1107. 
Atmanspacher, Harold (1994).  “Objectification as an Endo‐Exo Transition”, in Inside 
 Versus Outside, eds. H. Atmanspacher and G. Dalenoort, Berlin:  Springer‐
 Verlag, 15‐32. 
Barabási, A‐L.  (2002). Linked: The New Science of Network ,Cambridge MA: Perseus. 
Barabási, A‐L. and R. Albert (1999). “Emergence of Scaling in random networks”, 
 Science 286, 509‐512. 
Bak, Per (1996). How Nature Works; the science of self organized criticality, New 
 York:  Springer‐Verlag. 
Barthes, Roland (1964).  Elements of Semiology, New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 
 




Beyer, H‐G. (1998). “On the “explorative power” of ES/EP‐like algorithms”, in eds. A. 
E. Eiben, V. Porto, N. Saravanan, and D. Waagen,  Evolutionary Programming VII, 
 Heidelberg: Springer, 323‐334. 
Bongard, J. and V. Zykov, H. Lipson (2006). “Resilient machines through continuous 
 self‐modeling”, Science 314, 1118‐1121.  
Brooks, Daniel and Wiley, E. (1988). Evolution as Entropy, 2nd ed. Chicago: University 
 of Chicago. 
Castells, Manuel (2000). The Rise of the Network Society,  2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Christensen, C. and R. Albert (2007). “Using graph concepts to understand the 
 organization of complex systems”. International Journal of Bifurcation and 
 Chaos 17:7. 
Christensen, C. and J. Thakar, R. Albert (2007). “Systems‐level insights into cellular 
 regulation: inferring, analyzing and modeling intercellular networks”, IET 
 Systems Biology I, 61‐77. 
Cobley, P. and Litza Jansz (1999). Introducing Semiotics  Cambridge, UK: Icon Books. 
Darwin, Charles (1859). The Origin of Species New York: Washington Square Press, 
 1963. 
Deely, John (1990). Basics of Semiotics, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Dubois, Daniel (ed.) (2000a). “Review of Incursive, Hyperincursive and Anticipatory 
 Systems Foundation of Anticipation in Electromagnetism”, in ed. D. 
 Dubois, Computing Anticipatory Systems: CASYS 199, AIP Conference 
 Proceedings 517,  Melville, New York, 3‐30. 
 Dubois, Daniel (ed.) (2000b). “Theory of Incursive Synchronization and Application 
 to the Anticipation of a Chaotic Epidemic”, in ed. D. Dubois, International 
 Journal  of Computing Anticipatory Systems. Vol. 10. 2001 , Liege, 
 Belgium: CHAOS, 3‐18.   
 Dubois, David (ed.) (2002). “Theory of Computing Anticipatory Systems based on 
 differential delayed‐advance difference equations”, in ed. D. Dubois, 
 




 Computing Anticipatory Systems: CASYS 2001‐ Fifth International 
 Conference, ( American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings, 627, 
 Melville, New York), 3‐16.  
Eco, Umberto (1976). A Theory of Semiotics,  Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Fisher, R. (1930). The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Clarendon. 
Freeman, A. and J. Byers (2006). “Divergent Induced Responses to an Invasive 
 Predator in Marine Mussel Populations”. Science 313, 745 and 831‐833. 
Goldberg, D.E. (1989). Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization & Machine 
 Learning. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Grant, P. and R. Grant. (2006). “Evolution of character displacement in Darwin’s 
 finches”. Science 313, 224‐226. 
Guiraud, Pierre (1975). Semiology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper (1996). Signs of Meaning in the Universe, Bloomington: Indiana 
 University Press. 
Hofkirschner, W. (ed.) (1999). “Cartesian Cut, Heisenberg Cut, and the Concept of 
 Complexity”, in The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, ed. W. 
 Hofkirchner, Amsterdam: Gordon/Breach, 125‐147. 
Holland, John (1975). Adaptation in Natural and Artificial System, Ann Arbor: 
 University of Michigan Press  
Holland, John (1995). Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity,  Reading, 
 Mass: Addison‐Wesley. 
Ives, A. and S. Carpenter (2007). “Stability and Diversity of Ecosystems”. Science  
 317, 58‐62. 
Jaynes, E. (2003). Probability Theory: the logic of science, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
 University Press.  
Kauffman, Stuart (1993) . The Origins of Order, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lyotard, J‐F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition, London: Merlin. 
 




Matsuno, Koichiro (1998). “Dynamics of time and information in dynamic time”, 
 BioSystems 46, 1998, 57‐71. 
Matsuno, Koichiro (1999). “The clock and its triadic relationship”, in Semiotica. 127, 
 433‐452. 
Mattick, J. and M. Gagen (2005). “Accelerating Networks”. Science 307, 856‐858.  
Mayr, Ernst (1942). Systematics and the Origin of Species, New York: Columbia 
 University Press. 
Milo, R., S. Itzkovitz, N. Kashtan, R. Levitt, S. Shen‐Orr, I. Ayzenshtat, M. Sheffer, U. 
 Alon (2004). “Superfamilies of Evolved and Designed Networks”, Science.303, 
 1538‐1542. 
Monod, Jacques (1971). Chance and Necessity, New York: Knopf. 
Newman, M. and D. Watts, A‐L. Barabási (2006). The Structure and Dynamics of 
 Networks, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Nöth, Winfried (1995). Handbook of Semiotics, Bloomington: Indiana University 
 Press. 
Paton, Ron and K. Matsuno (1998). “Verbs, glue and categories in the cellular 
 economy”. Information Processing in Cells and Tissues, eds. M. Holcombe 
 and R. Paton , New York: Plenum,  253‐260. 
Primas, H. (1993) .“The Cartesian Cut, the Heisenberg cut, and disentangled 
 observers”,  in Symposia on the Foundation of Modern Physics: W. Pauli as a 
 Philosopher, eds. K. Laurikainen and C. Montonen, World Scientific, 
 Singapore, 245‐ 269. 
Peirce, Charles S.  (1931‐35). Collected Papers, eds. by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss and A. 
 Burks, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Citations are by volume and 
 paragraph number. 
Prieto. L.  (1975). Pertience et pratique, Paris: Minuit. 
Runyon, J. and M. Mescher, C. De Moraes (2006). “Volatile chemical cues guide host 
 location and  host selection by parasitic plants”, Science. 313, 1964‐1967. 
 




Rosen, Robert (1985). Anticipatory Systems, Oxford, MA: Pergamon Press. 
Rosen, Robert (1991). Life Itself,  New York: Columbia University Press. 
De Saussure, Ferdinand (1964). Course in General Linguistics, London: Peter Owen. 
Silverman, K. (1983). The Subject of Semiotics, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Thompson, D’Arcy (1917).  On Growth and Form, Cambridge: University of 
 Cambridge Press, 1966. 
Taborsky, Edwina. (2002). “Semiosis and Energy Transformation”, in Computing 
 Anticipatory Systems, CASYS 2001, ed. D. Dubois, AIP Conference 
 Proceedings 527, New York: Melville,  128‐138. 
Taborsky, Edwina (2006). “The Nature of the Sign as a WFF – A Well‐Formed 
 Formula”, in Computing Anticipatory Systems. CASYS 2005, ed. D. Dubois. 
 AIP Conference Proceedings.  Melville, New York.  
Watts, Duncan (1999) . Small Worlds: The Dynamics of networks between order and 
 randomness,  Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press. 
Wouters, P., I. Helsen and L. Leydesdorff (2004). “Internet time and the reliability of 
 search engines”. First Monday. Vol. 9, No. 10, October 2004. 
 http://www.firstmonday.org 
 
 
 
 
